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i 
1. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78A-4-103(2)(h) in that this 
appeal arises from the final judgment of the District Court, the Honorable Stephen L. 
Henriod presiding, which involved a domestic relations resolving all matters, including 
custody and parent-time, after a Bifurcated Divorce Decree. Although the Honorable Stephen 
L. Henriod stated his decision and Judgment on the record (Record, pages 149 and 150; 
Record, pages 202-2 through 202-7), he subsequently left the bench and Judge Henriod's 
statements relating to custody and child support calculations were thereafter interpreted by 
the Honorable Robert Adkins (Record, page 1681), which has resulted in this appeal. 
2. STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE # 1: Did the District Court err in awarding child support pursuant to the Utah Child 
Support Guidelines by employing the Sole Custody Worksheet to calculate the amount of base child 
support rather than the Joint Custody Worksheet? 
DETERMINATIVELAW:UtahCodeAnn.78B-12-102(14);f/rf);v. Udy,S93Y.2d 
1097 (Utah App. 1995). The Udy court held that "Although labeled 'sole custody/ the trial court 
awarded Mr. Udy visitation that exceeded the threshold for joint physical custody.... Thus, the court 
must follow the mandate of Utah's child support guidelines, and use the joint custody child 
support worksheet or make findings of fact justifying its deviation." Udy v. Udy, supra, at 1099 
[emphases added]. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "We have consistently held that the proper 
interpretation of a statute is a question of law that should be reviewed for correctness." State v. 
Barrett, 2005 UT 88, f 14,127 P.3d 682, 686. 
1
 It should be notes that even though the Minutes from the May 23,2011 telephone 
conference are confusing and ambiguous ("Court orders the child support is to be calculated as to 
petitioner having sole legal custody and joint legal custody." Emphasis added), the parties 
understood that Judge Adkins meant that child support should be calculated as to petitioner 
having sole physical custody. 
-4-
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3, STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. §783-12-102(14) states: 
"'Joint physical custody' means the child stays with each parent 
overnight for more than 30% of the year, and both parents 
contribute to the expenses of the child in addition to paying 
child support." 
4. STATEMENT OF CASE 
This case involves a dispute over the calculation of child support. 
Respondent/Appellant (hereinafter Father) contends that the Joint Physical Custody 
Worksheet should be used in calculating child support due to the fact that he was awarded 
approximately 160 overnights with the minor child and Petitioner/Appellee (hereinafter 
Mother) argues that the Sole Custody Worksheet should be used merely because Judge 
Henriod awarded her "physical custody." 
5. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At trial before the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod on July 8,2010, the court found that 
it would be in the best interest of the parties' minor child that Mother have "physical 
custody" of the minor child (Record, pages 150,202-4; see, also, Judgment, Record, page 
190, numbered paragraph 1). The court further found that it would be in the best interest of 
the minor child that the parties share "Joint Legal Custody" of the minor child (Record, pages 
150, 202-4; see, also, Judgment, Record, page 190, numbered paragraph 1). Father was 
awarded parent-time with the parties' minor child in an amount equal to approximately 160 
overnights per year (Record, pages 150, 202-4)2. The court made findings regarding the 
income of each party, but did not calculate the child support to be ordered (Record, pages 
2
 This is Respondent's calculation based on the number of nights per year that Judge 
Henriod awarded to Respondent/Father. See, also, Record, pages 159-163. 
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149,202-6). Father's attorney was ordered to prepare the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law as well as the final Decree of Divorce (Record, page 149). 
Pursuant to the parent-time Order, Father's counsel calculated child support using the 
Joint Custody Worksheet of the Utah Child Support Guideline. Mother's counsel objected, 
asserting that sole physical custody was awarded to Mother based on Judge Henriod's 
verbiage "physical custody" (see, Record, page 152, ^2). 
Due to the retirement of Judge Henriod, the Honorable Robert Adkins was assigned 
to the case. Judge Adkins held a telephonic conference on May 23, 2011 with counsel for 
both Mother and Father. After argument by counsel, the court held that the base amount of 
child support would be assessed pursuant to the Sole Custody Worksheet (Record, page 168). 
6. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Father contends terms and verbiage do not control the manner in which child support 
is calculated but that the statutory manner in which child support is calculated is determined 
by the number of overnights that each parent is awarded. Even if an error in terminology is 
made, the counting of the overnights is what is important and what determines whether the 
Sole Physical Custody Worksheet is used or whether the Joint Physical Custody Worksheet 
is used. 
The term "physical custody" is vague and gives absolutely no guidance regarding the 
manner in which one should calculate child support. To determine which Worksheet to use, 
one is required to ascertain the number of overnights that each parent has been awarded by 
the court. Other terms such as "primary custodial parent" which is used extensively in Utah 
does not convey an absolute awareness of whether the "primary custodial parent" has Sole 
Physical Custody or whether the "primary custodial parent" shares Joint Physical Custody. 
As will be seen and established hereinafter, the law and the facts of this case clearly 
and categorically result in the conclusion that the term "physical custody" as used by Judge 
Henriod meant "primary custodial parent" and nothing more. Mother is erroneously 
- 6 -
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contending that the use of these terms results in a Sole Physical Custody Order by Judge 
Henriod. 
7. ARGUMENT 
Child support "is intended to be a shared obligation of both parents/' Thronson v. 
Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 (Utah App. 1991), and should be used to "assure the children a 
standard of living comparable to that which they would have experienced if no divorce had 
occurred." ,4//ra/ v. Allred, 191 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah App. 1990) (citing Ostler v. Ostler, 
789 P.2d 713,716 (Utah App. 1990)). Both the custodial and non-custodial parents have the 
same duty to support their child. Alfred, supra, at 1112 (Utah App. 1990). 
Joint Physical Custody exists when a "child stays with each parent overnight for more 
than 30% of the year, and both parents contribute to the expenses of the child in addition to 
paying child support." Utah Code Ann, § 78B-12-102(14). In Udy v. Udy, 893 P.2d 1097 
(Utah App. 1995), Ms. Udy argued that the trial court had discretion to use the sole custody 
worksheet in determining child support because she was awarded "sole" custody of the 
parties' child. Udy, supra, at 1100: 
"Ms. Udy contends that the trial court did not err when it 
awarded child support based upon a sole custody worksheet. She 
argues that because the trial court awarded her'sole' custody of 
Joshua and granted Mr. Udy only 'expanded' visitation, the 
court had the discretion to apply the sole custody worksheet. We 
are not persuaded. Labels do not control the child support 
determination. This court indicated in Thronson v. Thronson, 
810 P.2d 428, 429 n. 1 (Utah App. 1991), that the labels 
'custody' and 'visitation' ascribed by the trial court are not as 
important as the description given by the court in defining their 
meaning in the context of a given case." 
-7-
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As is clearly and unequivocally set forth in Udy, "labels do not control the child support 
determination" and that, despite the "sole custody" label, Mr. Udy received visitation 
exceeding the joint physical custody threshold under § 78-45-2(10) [now § 78B-12-102(14)] 
requiring the court to use either the joint custody child support worksheet, or to justify any 
deviation through Findings of Fact. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-202(3) (cited in Udy as 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7(3) (Supp.1994)); Udy, at 1100 (citing AUred, at 1111 (Utah App. 
1990)). 
Findings of Fact must explain the reason for any deviation and why a guideline-based 
calculation is inequitable. Udy, at 1100. Findings must also be "sufficiently detailed and 
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on 
each factual issue was reached." AUred, supra, at 1111 (Utah App. 1990) (quoting Acton v. 
Deliran, 111 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)). If the court's findings sufficiently rebut the 
guidelines, it must then consider the following and any other relevant factors in determining 
support: "(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties; (b) the relative wealth and 
income of the parties; (c) the ability of the obligor to earn; (d) the ability of the obligee to 
earn; (e) the ability of an incapacitated adult child to earn, or other benefits received by the 
adult child or on the adult child's behalf including Supplemental Security Income; (f) the 
needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child; (g) the ages of the parties; and (h) the 
responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee for the support of others." Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-12-202(3). In AUred, the lower court's findings were held insufficient because it lacked 
any findings regarding the total needed amount of monthly child support, and failed to 
explain how it ultimately decided support—instead the court relied on a figure the parties 
previously stipulated as a possible support amount. AUred, at 1111 (Utah App. 1990). 
None of the foregoing requirements were considered by Judge Henriod who did 
nothing more than to state the words "physical custody" and then set forth the parent-time 
plan which amounted to 160 overnights per year with Father. Attached as Addendum 2 is a 
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true and correct copy of the transcript of the Judgment/Order proceedings and/or Findings 
of Fact and Judgment by Judge Henriod which states the following with regards to Custody 
and Parent-time: 
"Custody. Physical custody of Joey to the petitioner, j oint 
legal custody. The advisory guidelines - and Counsel knows 
what that means, and you folks will get copies - will be part of 
this judgment. 
Parent time, the statutory holiday schedule, alternate 
weeks, Friday night, Saturday night and Sunday night, which 
you've been doing. On the off week, two overnights. That will 
be Thursday and Friday so that Mr. Goldsmith can keep Joey 
longer on Friday because he doesn't work on Friday. So I'd say 
4 o'clock he gets returned, unless there's a reason to do 
otherwise, and that's when he's not in school. Otherwise he gets 
returned to school in the morning." 
Addendum 2: Judge's Ruling, page 4, lines 10-21 
Judge Henriod's again refers to "physical custody" a bit further into his Judgment, 
which further supports Father's position that the term does not impact or determine the 
manner in which the calculation of child support occurs. 
"Now, having physical custody doesn't mean the physical 
custodian can change any parent time schedule or interfere with 
phone calls. It doesn't mean that you can block the defendant -
or respondent from taking Joey to visit his paternal parents 
which you did." 
Addendum 2: Judge's Ruling, page 5, lines 4 - 8 
- 9 -
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t 
If the custodial parent cannot change parent-time, then the custodial parent has no ability to 
change or adjust child support as child support is calculated by determining how many 
overnights per year a parent receives. 
More incriminating is to look at the Child Support Calculators which are found on the 
Utah State Court's website where it is stated when to use the "Sole Custody Calculator" and 
when to use the "Joint Custody Calculator." 
"Sole Custody Calculator 
The Sole Custody Calculator is used when the 
non-custodial parent has fewer than 111 
overnights a year with the children. If overnights 
are not specified in your order, the Sole Custody 
Calculator is usually appropriate where the order 
refers to the custody arrangement as sole legal and 
sole physical or Joint legal and sole physical or 
joint legal with primary physical, or where one 
parent receives custody under an order that 
contains language similar to: permanent care 
control and custody of the children. 
Joint Custody Calculator 
The Joint Physical Custody calculator is used 
when each parent has more than 110 
overnights a year with the children." [Emphasis] 
Both dad and mom have more than 110 overnights per year in this case and, as such, the Joint 
Custody Calculator must be used. 
When entering the Judgment regarding child support, Judge Henriod stated: 
-10-
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id suppor it i;v ill be based upon imputed income to the 
petitioner of $5,800 a month. That's based upon the figures 
contained in affidavits that she's filed cirIivi in tins ease I'm 
specifically finding voluntary unemployment, and also on her 
testimony today that she's not going to apply for just any job. 
'•' .-'•":. .'• '•• I he re spoi idei it's incoi ne w ill be $5,100 a n lonth ' I his child • •• ••• •• 
support goes back to the date of the complaint. 
It will be offset with — I don't know what that number's 
going to be. I didn't do a worksheet, bi it it w ill be offset b> the 
amounts paid by Mi Goldsmith, which Ms. Larsen testified 
were 200 a month from April through June, from Ji il> '08 tc 
December 09 300 a month, and $495 a month since January.' 
Addendum 2: Judge's Ruling, page 6, lines 1-13 [Emphasis added] 
Judge Henriod made absolutely no findings • • -i* • . . .
 t Nr(j 
calculation would be inequitable. He stated what the income of the parties would be and 
further stated that he did not do a worksheet. The requirements of Udy9 Allred and Utah Code 
Ann. 78B-I .V202(3)were neither addreissed, norsalistied V such then; tan he nodn union 
from the guideline support. 
The Honorable Judge Adkins did not attempt to change Judge Henriod's Judgment 
because of the use of the terms ""physical custody," then the Sole Physical Custody 
Worksheet should be used. This was clearly an error of law and an abuse of Judge Adkins 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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one has 160 overnights per year: there exists a JOINT PHYSICAL CUSTODY relationship 
and the Joint Custody Worksheet MUST, AS A MATTER OF LAW, be used. 
Any deviation from the above principles and law must be supported by the Findings 
of Fact with a finding of those elements and circumstances set forth in Utah Code 78B-12-
202(3). Respondent first prepared the Findings of Fact as Ordered by Judge Henriod. See, 
Addendum 3. After the hearing with Judge Adkins, it was Ordered to change 119 of the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, however, the court nonetheless has not included 
a specific explanation for its use of the Sole Custody Worksheet in calculating child support. 
See, Addendum 4 and Record, pages 179-185. Respondent was awarded more than 110 
overnights per year, granting him 30% or more of the year's total overnights, as was the case 
in Udy. Thus, because child support was calculated using the Sole Custody Worksheet, the 
court should have made Findings of Fact and explained how these findings warrant deviation 
from the guidelines. Udy v. Udy, 893 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah App. 1995). 
According to % 19 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared on May 
23,2011 and entered on June 20,2011 (Record, pages 179-185), the court has not included 
a specific explanation for its use of the Sole Custody Worksheet in calculating child support. 
Unless more detailed findings for this guideline departure appear in the court's Order, the 
court has Failed this requirement, making its Order erroneous and ripe for amendment and/or 
reversal. Allred, at 1111 (Utah App. 1990). 
8. CONCLUSION 
A label of "sole" custody does not trigger the use of the Sole Custody Worksheet. A 
label of "physical custody" does not trigger the use of the Sole Custody Worksheet. And, visa 
versa. Instead, both parents have the same burden to provide child support, regardless of the 
-12-
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label, and the amount of that burden is determined h\ In1 .miomil >t overnights per > ear. 
Because Respondent has more than 30% of the overnights in a year, he is entitled to a child 
suppo^  the Joint Custody Worksheet, unless the trial court 
sets forth specific Findings that warrant deviation The t ouil in llns case departed IT in the 
guidelines but failed to state specific reasons for such departure, which it could not have 
done because * f, I \UTC stated by Judge Henriod which are set forth 
in \ddendum 2 H specific findings and related reasoning do not appear 11 the 
Order/Judgment, then no deviation from the guidelines are permissible. 
For the reasons srt lorlli .ibm t, ml is u ^petltulh >iihmilted that the trial court [Judge 
Adkins] erred and abused its discretion in Ordering that the Sole Custody Worksheet must 
be used It is therefore requested that this matter be remanded with instructions to amend the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions ol'l aw ;nul Indgniitiii in ii'dVci thai On Imni 1 nstod> 
Worksheet be used. 
DATED: March 15 2012 • Respectfully submitted, 
* K^tssL— 
Attorney for RespondentXAppellarit, 
WILLARJD LEROY GOLDSMITHIV 
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
It is hereby certified that the word counter in WordPerfect which was used to create this 
Opening Brief indicates that the length of the Opening Brief is 3228 words. 
DATED: March 15,2012 By: 
—• — T O N C . j o m ^ Attorney for Respondent/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
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78B-12-102. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Adjusted gross income" means income calculated under Subsection 78B-12-204(1). 
(2) "Administrative agency" means the Office of Recovery Services or the Department of 
Human Services. 
(3) "Administrative order" means an order that has been issued by the Office of Recovery 
Services, the Department of Human Services, or an administrative agency of another state or 
other comparable jurisdiction with similar authority to that of the office. 
(4) "Base child support award" means the award that may be ordered and is calculated iising 
the guidelines before additions for medical expenses and work-related child care costs. 
(5) "Base combined child support obligation table," "child support table," "base child support 
obligation table," "low income table," or "table" means the appropriate table in Part 3, Tables. 
(6) "Cash medical support" means an obligation to equally share all reasonable and necessary 
medical and dental expenses of children 
(7) "Child" means: 
(a) a son or daughter under the age of 18 years who is not otherwise emancipated, 
self-supporting, married, or a member of the armed forces of the United States; 
(b) a son or daughter over the age of 18 years, while enrolled in high school during the normal 
and expected year of graduation and not otherwise emancipated, self-supporting, married, or a 
member of the armed forces of the United States; or 
(c) a son or daughter of any age who is incapacitated from earning a living and, if able to 
provide some financial resources to the family, is not able to support self by own means. 
(8) "Child support" means a base child support award, or a monthly financial award for 
uninsured medical expenses, ordered by a tribunal for the support of a child, including current 
periodic payments, all arrearages which accrue under an order for current periodic payments, and 
sum certain judgments awarded for arrearages, medical expenses, and child care costs. 
(9) "Child support order" or "support order" means a judgment, decree, or order of a tribunal 
whether interlocutory or final, whether or not prospectively or retroactively modifiable, whether 
incidental to a proceeding for divorce, judicial or legal separation, separate maintenance, 
paternity, guardianship, civil protection, or otherwi.se which: 
(a) establishes or modifies child support; 
(b) reduces child support arrearages to judgment; or 
(c) establishes child support or registers a child support order under Chapter 14, Uniform 
Interstate Family Support Act 
(10) "Child support services" or "IV-D child support services" means services provided 
pursuant to Part D of Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 651 et seq. 
(11) "Court" means the district court or juvenile court. 
(12) "Guidelines" means the directions for the calculate u i and application of child support in 
Part 2, Calculation and Adjustment. 
(13) "Income" means earnings, compensation, or other payment due to an individual, 
regardless of source, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, pay, 
allowances, contract payment, or otherwise, including severance pay, sick pay, and incentive pay. 
"Income" includes: 
(a) all gain derived from capital assets, labor, or both, including profit gained through 
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sale or conversion of capital assets; 
(b) interest and dividends; 
(c) periodic payments made under pension or retirement programs or insurance policies of any 
type; 
(d) unemployment compensation benefits; 
(e) workers'compensation benefits; and 
(f) disability benefits. 
(14) "Joint physical custody" means the child stays with each parent overnight for more than 
30% of the year, and both parents contribute to the expenses of the child in addition to paying 
child support. 
(15) "Medical expenses" means health and dental expenses and related insurance costs. 
(16) "Obligee" means an individual, this state, another state, or another comparable 
jurisdiction to whom child support is owed or who is entitled to reimbursement of child support 
or public assistance. 
(17) "Obligor" means any person owing a duty of support. 
(18) "Office" means the Office of Recovery Services within the Department of Human 
Services. 
(19) "Parent" includes a natural parent, or an adoptive parent 
(20) "Split custody" means that each parent has physical custody of at least one of the 
children. 
(21) "State" includes any state, territory, possession of the United States, the District of 
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Native American Tribe, or other comparable 
domestic or foreign jurisdiction. 
(22) "Temporary" means a period of time that is projected to be less than 12 months in 
duration. 
(23) "Third party" means an agency or a person other than the biological or adoptive parent or 
a child who provides care, maintenance, and support to a child. 
(24) "Tribunal" means the district court, the Department of Human Services, Office of 
Recovery Services, or court or administrative agency of any state, territory, possession of the 
United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Native American 
Tribe, or other comparable domestic or foreign jurisdiction. 
(25) "Work-related child care costs" means reasonable child care costs for up to a full-time 
work week or training schedule as necessitated by the employment or training of a parent under 
Section 78B-12-215. 
(26) "Worksheets" means the forms used to aid in calculating the base child support award. 
Amended by Chapter 142,2009 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 78B12J)10200.ZIP 4,498 Bytes 
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78B-12-202. Determination of amount of support- Rebuttable guidelines. 
(1) (a) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount granted by prior court order unless 
there has been a substantial change of circumstance on the part of the obligor or obligee or 
adjustment under Subsection 78B-12-210(6) has been made. 
(b) If the prior court order contains a stipulated provision for the automatic adjustment for 
prospective support, the prospective support shall be the amount as stated in the order, without a 
showing of a material change of circumstances, if the stipulated provision: 
(i) is clear and unambiguous; 
(ii) is self-executing; 
(iii) provides for support which equals or exceeds the base child support award required by 
the guidelines; and 
(iv) does not allow a decrease in support as a result of the obligor's voluntary reduction of 
income. 
(2) If no prior court order exists, a substantial change in circumstances has occurred, or a 
petition to modify an order under Subsection 78B-12-210(6) has been filed, the court 
determining the amount of prospective support shall require each party to file a proposed award 
of child support using the guidelines before an order awarding child support or modifying an 
existing award may be granted 
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the guidelines, the court shall establish 
support after considering all relevant factors, including but not limited to: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties; 
• (b) the relative wealth and income of the parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the ability of an incapacitated adult child to earn, or other benefits received by the adult 
child or on the adult child's behalf including Supplemental Security Income; 
(f) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child; 
(g) the ages of the parties; and 
(h) the responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee for the support of others. 
(4) When no prior court order exists, the court shall detennine and assess all arrearages based 
upon the guidelines described in this chapter. 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on July 8, 2010) 
THE COURT: Okay, everybody's here. We're on the 
record. I'm going to ask Mr. Jolley to prepare findings and 
a judgment, and I'm going to — before I get into the direct 
rulings, I have a few comments. I found the petitioner's 
testimony to be evasive manipulation in attempt to continue 
to be over-controlling. I believe she's been over-controlling 
through the entire period of the parties' separation, and would 
like to continue to do so. If she does, that will be contrary 
to the best interest of Joey.. On the contrary, I found the 
respondent's testimony to be straightforward and credible. 
A word about the motion for DNA testing. That motion 
was morally and ethically wrong, and potentially extremely 
harmful to Joey and to the respondent. It had — if it had 
been done, it would have been an attempt to bastardize a child, 
and no parent should ever want to do that to a child. This 
is — this is again for — I missed your current last name. 
MS. LARSEN: Larsen. 
THE COURT: Larsen. This is mostly for Ms. Larsen. 
Unfortunately, maybe for you and certainly for me, I am now 
in charge of your parent time situation, because you folks 
haven't worked it as well as you should have, and that's mostly 
due to Ms. Larsen. You cannot change Court orders regarding 
parent time, period, even though you're going to have physical 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-3-
custody. Do you understand what I'm saying? 
MS. LARSEN: Yes. 
THE COURT: If you decide it's not going to be — 
excuse me — good for Joey to spend time with his father for 
whatever reason, and he comes back here to Court, you will go 
to jail. That's a promise. You don't interfere. 
You don't interfere with telephone time either, and 
what you testified you did is interfering with telephone time. 
He calls, you miss the call, you get the voice message, you 
say, nJoey, it's time to call your father back now," and you 
hand him the phone. 
You do not give a 7-year old the option to do something 
different. When he's 15, that will be different, but a 7-year-
old doesn't get to decide whether he goes for parent time or 
not. That applies to you, sir, too. Doesn't get to decide 
whether he makes a phone call or not. He doesn't. That puts 
way too much pressure on the child, and it should never happen. 
Joey and his dad can talk as many times as they want 
during the day, as long as it's not during sleeping time, and 
it isn't what we'd call harassment. I think everybody except 
possibly Ms. Larsen understands what that means. Just reason-
able times when you need to talk, or want to talk. 
Now, football and golf are wonderful activities. They 
are in the best interest of the child. Neither parent is ever 
ordered to pay the cost of that kind of activity. Good parents 
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who are concerned about the welfare of their child will share 
those expenses, ail other things being equal; but there's going 
to be no Court order beyond the child support. That's something 
you have to work out voluntarily. 
I found insufficient evidence to make a finding of 
fact that the $20,000 went into the house as a down payment/ 
or even that it came from the personal injury settlement. I 
also found insufficient evidence to make a finding of fact that 
there is any equity in the marital home. 
Custody. Physical custody of Joey to the petitioner, 
joint legal custody. The advisory guidelines — and Counsel 
knows what that means, and you folks will get copies — will be 
part of this judgment. 
Parent time, the statutory holiday schedule, alternate 
weeks, Friday night, Saturday night and Sunday night, which 
you've been doing. On the off week, two overnights. That 
will be Thursday and Friday so that Mr. Goldsmith can keep 
Joey longer on Friday because he doesn't work on Friday. So 
I'd say 4 o'clock he gets returned, unless there's a reason to 
do otherwise, and that's when he's not in school. Otherwise he 
gets returned to school in the morning. 
Don't enroll Joey in activities that interfere with 
the other parent's time without the agreement of the other 
parent, and without attempting — you should attempt to accom-
modate what Joey wants and what's good for him. I think foot-
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ball, soccer, golf, any of that is good for him, but it has 
to be done jointly, and has to be done with Joey's welfare in 
mind-
Now, having physical custody doesn't mean the physical 
custodian can change any parent time schedule or interfere with 
phone calls. It doesn't mean that you can block the defendant 
— or respondent from taking Joey to visit his paternal parents 
which you did. 
Frankly, given the testimony I heard about the 
dysfunctional relationship between Ms. Larsen and her parents, 
I can't see how she can criticize the relationship between Joey 
and any other grandparents. Again, you don't give a 7-year-old 
a choice about spending parent time or making telephone calls 
or anything else. You tell him what he needs to do. 
Both parents need to be flexible- They need to 
accommodate Joey and the other parent. Means if you can't 
decide, the schedule controls; but if you can agree on other 
changes, that will be in Joey's best interest and you should 
try to do that. 
You need to understand, the older he gets the more 
flexible you've got to become. At 7 you can control him. At 
15 he's going to be controlling you. He's going to tell you 
he's too busy, he's got things to do at school; and if you want 
him to continue to have a good relationship with him, you're 
just going to have to roll with it. That's the way it works. 
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Child support will be based upon imputed income to the 
petitioner of $5,800 a month. That's based upon the figures 
contained in affidavits that she's filed earlier in this case. 
I'm specifically finding voluntary unemployment/ and also on 
her testimony today that she's not going to apply for just any 
job. The respondent's income will be $5,100 a month. This 
child support goes back to the date of the complaint. 
It will be offset with — I don't know what that 
number's going to be, I didn't do a worksheet, but it will be 
offset by the amounts paid by Mr. Goldsmith, which Ms. Larsen 
testified were 200 a month from April through June, from July 
*08 to December *09, 300 a month, and $495 a month since 
January. 
If the parties have evidence to prove that that was 
different, then whether it benefits either party, they are 
welcome to provide that information to Counsel and make that 
adjustment. Any payments that Mr. Goldsmith made to things 
like football or golf will be counted as child support for 
purposes of determining what that arrearage amount might be. 
As far as the real property is concerned, anything 
that went into the house was comingled, became joint property. 
As I said before, I don't have enough evidence to make any 
finding that there's anything in terms of equity in this home. 
The home is awarded to the petitioner — or to the respondent, 
and he assumes all debt incurred with it. 
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1 I Marital debt — we're talking about the credit cards 
2 — the amounts will be established either as of the day of 
3 I divorce, April of x09 or today with respect to each amount, 
4 whichever is lower. So if they've been paid down since April 
5 of *09, the parties — Mr. Goldsmith, who I guess would have 
6 I paid it down, gets the benefit of that. I guess it would 
7 I accrue to Ms. Larsen, because I'm going to order that that is 
8 marital debt, and the parties will share it equally. 
9 J Now, the way you handle that is up to Counsel. You 
10 can offset it. If there's going to be an arrearage against 
11 I Mr. Goldsmith, for instance, on the child support, that can 
12 be offset on the marital debt. The IRS is a joint debt. The 
13 petitioner is awarded the Volvo, subject to its indebtedness. 
14 Counsel, anything I've missed? 
15 MR. JOLLEY: No, your Honor. 
16 I THE COURT: Okay, thank you. Court's adjourned. 
17 I (Judge's ruling concluded) 
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VERNON C. JOLLEY 6906 
JOLLEY & JOLLEY, A Professional Law Corporation 
9710 South 700 East, Suite 111 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Fax:(801)495-1444 
Telephone: (801) FATHERS 
(801)495-1442 
Attorney for Respondent: WILLARD LEROY GOLDSMITH IV 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RENEE SPALL-GOLDSMITH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
WILLARD LEROY GOLDSMITH IV, 
Respondent 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 084300172 
Judge: HENRIOD 
Commissioner: TACK 
This matter was tried to the bench on the 8th of July, 2010 on the Petitioner's Complaint and 
Respondent Counterclaim for Divorce. Petitioner was represented by OLIVIA D. UITTO and 
Respondent was represented by VERNON C. JOLLEY. The Court heard testimony from the 
Petitioner and the Respondent, various other witnesses, received exhibits and heard arguments from 
counsel. After a short recess, the Court made the following Findings of Fact, Orders, Judgments and 
Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court makes the following Findings of Fact to be in the best interests of the parties and their 
minor child Joey: 
INITIAL FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Petitioner was evasive, manipulative and attempted to continue to be over-
controlling as the custodial parent If she continues in such actions, it will be against the best 
1 
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interests of Joey. 
2. Respondent was straight-forward and credible. 
3. Petitioner's request for DNA testing was morally and ethically wrong. It was also 
potentially extremely harmful to Joey and to Respondent. It was an attempt to bastardize the child 
and no parent should ever want to do that. 
4. Petitioner has changed court Orders concerning parent-time and has changed court 
Orders concerning parent-time. Petitioner hasinterferedwithparent-timeandisnotto interfere with 
parent-time or telephone time. If she does, she will go to jail. 
5. Petitioner has given Joey the option of whether Joey will call back his father and she 
shall not give Joey the option whether to call back his father or not 
6. The Court finds that Respondent and Joey may talk as many times as they want during 
the day as long as it is reasonable and not harassment to Petitioner or during sleeping time. 
7. Football and golf are wonderful activities and are in the best-interests of the child. 
Neither parent is ordered to pay for those activity. Good parents will share these expenses. But there 
is no court Order to pay these expenses. 
8. There was insufficient evidence to find that $20,000 went into the house as a down 
payment or that it came from Petitioner's personal injury settlement 
9. The Court finds that there is no equity in the home. 
CUSTODY 
10. With regards to custody, the court finds that it would be in the best interests of Joey 
that Petitioner will have physical custody of the minor child. The court finds that it would be in the 
best interests of Joey that Petitioner and Respondent will have Joint Legal Custody of the minor 
child. 
11. The Court finds that it is in the best interest of the parties and Joey that the Advisory 
2 
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Guidelines as found in Utah Code Ann, 30-3-2 and 30-3-3 be implemented and will be part of the 
court's Order. 
PARENT-TIME 
12. The court finds the following parent-time schedule to be in the best interests of the 
minor child. Parent-time shall follow the statutory holiday schedule. The parties shall have 
alternating weekends and Respondent will have two overnights on off weeks, that is, during those 
weeks where Petitioner has the following weekend with Joey. These additional parent-time days will 
be Thursdays and Fridays, which means that Respondent will pick-up Joey on Wednesdays and 
return on Fridays prior to Petitioner's scheduled weekend parent-time thereby resulting in 
Respondent having Wednesday and Thursday nights with Joey on the weeks following Respondent's 
weekend parent-time. 
13. The court finds that the parties shall not enroll Joey in activities that interfere with 
other parent's time without consulting the other parent. 
14. The court finds that activities such as golf, football, and soccer are good for Joey, but 
these activities must be done jointly and with Joey's welfare in mind. 
15. The court finds that physical custody does not mean that you can change parent-time 
or phone schedules. The Petitioner cannot block Respondent from taking Joey to paternal 
grandparents. Joey does not get a choice. Joey needs to be told what to do and that parent-time is 
important. 
16. The court finds that parents shall be flexible and agree on changes that would be die 
best interests of Joey. The older Joey gets, the more flexible the parents need to become. At seven 
years old, Joey is easy to control. At fifteen years old, he will control the parties. 
CHILD SUPPORT 
17. For computation of child support, the court finds evidence sufficient to imputed 
$5,800 per month to the Petitioner. This is based upon figures from aflSdavits from Petitioner. The 
3 
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Court specifically finds voluntary unemployment for the Petitioner and based on testimony that she 
is not just going to apply "for just any job." 
18. The Court finds the Respondent's income to be $5,100 per month. 
19. The Court finds that child support is retroactive to the date of the Complaint. It shall 
be offset by amounts previously paid by Respondent Lee Goldsmith. These amounts were: $200 per 
month for April through June of 2008, $300 per month for July 2008 through December 2009 and 
$495 per month since January 2010. 
20. If parties have evidence that this is different they can provide that information to 
counsel and make an adjustment for purposes of child support. 
21. Any past payments for things like football or golf that Respondent may have paid may 
be counted towards child support 
PROPERTY 
22. The court finds that anything that came into the house became co-mingled and 
joint-property. 
23. The Court finds that there is no equity in home. 
24. The court finds that the home should be awarded to Respondent and that he should 
assume all debt associated with the home. 
MARITAL DEBT 
25. The Court finds that amount of credit card debt will be established from date of 
divorce, May 8,2009 or July 8,2010, whichever is lower. The court finds that the credit card debt 
is marital debt and shall be divided equally. Counsel for both sides can determine how to handle this 
division. It can be offset with any arrears of the Respondent 
26. The Court finds that the IRS debt is a joint debt. 
27. The Court finds that the Petitioner should be awarded the Volvo. 
4 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court concludes that the parties, having previously been granted a Bifurcated 
Decree of Divorce, are still subject to the jurisdiction of the Court as set out above under the Court's 
Findings of Facts and that the Findings of Fact as set forth above are consistent with law and equity. 
2. The Court concludes that the terms, conditions and Findings on the matters tried on 
the Bifurcated Decree of Divorce are in the best interests of the parties and their minor child, that the 
terms are fair and reasonable, and all other issues of dispute have been resolved with the Court 
pursuant to the above Findings of Fact. 
SIGNED and DATED this day of , 2010. 
BY THE COURT 
THE HONORABLE JUDGE HENRIOD 
Third District Court Judge 
Approval as to form 
Olivia D.Uitto 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUBMIT FOR SIGNATURE 
You are hereby given notice, pursuant to Rule 7(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that they 
undersigned attorney will submit the above foregoing order for signature by the court, upon the 
expiration of 5 days from the date of this notice, plus 3 days for mailing, unless written objection is 
filed prior to that time. 
Dated: September 15,2010 
:
 VERNON CJOLLEY 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the date set forth below, I served a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing document identified as FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW on the 
following named persons by depositing said document in the United States mail, postage prepaid, 
addressed as follows: 
Olivia D. Uitto, Ph.D. 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 711872 
Salt Lake City, UT 84171 
DATED: September 15,2010 By: 
VERNON C.JOLLEY 
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VERNON C. JOLLEY 6906 
JOLLEY & JOLLEY, A Professional Law Corporation 
9710 South 700 East, Suite 111 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Fax:(801)495-1444 
Telephone: (801) FATHERS 
(801)495-1442 
Attorney for Respondent: WILLARD LEROY GOLDSMITH IV 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RENEE SPALL-GOLDSMITH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
•WILLARD LEROY GOLDSMITH IV, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 084300172 
Judge: ADKINS 
Commissioner: TACK 
This matter was tried to the bench on the 8th of July, 2010 on the Petitioner's Complaint and 
Respondent Counterclaim for Divorce. Petitioner was represented by OLIVIA D. UITTO and 
Respondent was represented by VERNON C. JOLLEY. The Court heard testimony from the 
Petitioner and the Respondent, various other witnesses, received exhibits and heard arguments from 
counsel. After a short recess, the Court made the following Findings of Fact, Orders, Judgments and 
Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court makes the following Findings of Fact to be in the best interests of the parties and their 
minor child Joey: 
INITIAL FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Petitioner was evasive, manipulative and attempted to continue to be over-
controlling as the custodial parent. If she continues in such actions, it will be against the best 
1 
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interests of Joey. 
2. Respondent was straight-forward and credible. 
3. Petitioner's request for DNA testing was morally and ethically wrong. It was also 
potentially extremely harmful to Joey and to Respondent. It was an attempt to bastardize the child 
and no parent should ever want to do that. 
4. Petitioner has changed court Orders concerning parent-time and has changed court 
Orders concerning parent-time. Petitionerhasinterferedwithparent-timeandisnotto interfere with 
parent-time or telephone time. If she does, she will go to jail. 
5. Petitioner has given Joey the option of whether Joey will call back his father and she 
shall not give Joey the option whether to call back his father or not 
6. The Court finds that Respondent and Joey may talk as many times as they want during 
the day as long as it is reasonable and not harassment to Petitioner or during sleeping time. 
7. Football and golf are wonderfiil activities and are in the best-interests of the child. 
Neither parent is ordered to pay for those activity. Good parents will share these expenses. But there 
is no court Order to pay these expenses. 
8. There was insufficient evidence to find that $20,000 went into the house as a down 
payment or that it came from Petitioner's personal injury settlement. 
9. The Court finds that there is no equity in the home. 
CUSTODY 
10. With regards to custody, the court finds that it would be in the best interests of Joey 
that Petitioner will have physical custody of the minor child. The court finds that it would be in the 
best interests of Joey that Petitioner and Respondent will have Joint Legal Custody of the minor 
child. 
11. The Court finds that it is in the best interest of the parties and Joey that the Advisory 
2 
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Guidelines as found in Utah Code Ann. 30-3-2 and 30-3-3 be implemented and will be part of the 
court's Order. 
PARENT-TIME 
12. The court finds the following parent-time schedule to be in the best interests of the 
minor child. Parent-time shall follow the statutory holiday schedule. The parties shall have 
alternating weekends and Respondent will have two overnights on off weeks, that is, during those 
weeks where Petitioner has the following weekend with Joey. These additional parent-time days will 
be Thursdays and Fridays, which means that Respondent will pick-up Joey on Wednesdays and 
return on Fridays prior to Petitioner's scheduled weekend parent-time thereby resulting in 
Respondent having Wednesday and Thursday nights with Joey on the weeks following Respondent * s 
weekend parent-time. 
13- The court finds that the parties shall not enroll Joey in activities that interfere with 
other parent's time without consulting the other parent. 
14. The court finds that activities such as golf, football, and soccer are good for Joey, but 
these activities must be done jointly and with Joey's welfare in mind. 
15. The court finds that physical custody does not mean that you can change parent-time 
or phone schedules. The Petitioner cannot block Respondent from taking Joey to paternal 
grandparents. Joey does not get a choice. Joey needs to be told what to do and that parent-time is 
important 
16. The court finds that parents shall be flexible and agree on changes that would be the 
best interests of Joey. The older Joey gets, the more flexible the parents need to become. At seven 
years old, Joey is easy to control. At fifteen years old, he will control the parties. 
CHILD SUPPORT 
17. For computation of child support, the court finds evidence sufficient to imputed 
$5,800 per month to the Petitioner. This is based upon figures from ajBSdavits from Petitioner. The 
3 :" 
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Court specifically finds voluntary unemployment for the Petitioner and based on testimony that she 
is not just going to apply 'for just any job/9 
18. The Court finds the Respondent's income to be $5,100 per month. 
19. The Court finds that the Child Support Obligation Worksheet for Sole Custody is 
appropriate in this case. A copy is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. Based thereon, the base child 
support amount payable by Respondent to Petitioner is $509.00 per month. The Court finds that child 
support is retroactive to the date of the Complaint It shall be offset by amounts previously paid by 
Respondent Lee Goldsmith. These amounts were: $200 per month for April through June of 2008, 
$300 per month for July 2008 through December 2009 and $495 per month since January 2010. 
20. If parties have evidence that this is different they can provide that information to 
counsel and make an adjustment for purposes of child support. 
21. Any past payments for things like football or golf that Respondent may have paid may 
be counted towards child support. 
PROPERTY 
22. The court finds that anything that came into the house became co-mingled and 
joint-property. 
23. The Court finds that there is no equity in home. 
24. The court finds that the home should be awarded to Respondent and that he should 
assume all debt associated with the home. 
MARITAL DEBT 
25. The Court finds that amount of credit card debt will be established from date of 
divorce, May 8,2009 or July 8,2010, whichever is lower. The court finds that the credit card debt 
is marital debt and shall be divided equally. Counsel for both sides can determine how to handle this 
division. It can be offset with any arrears of the Respondent. 
26. The Court finds that the IRS debt is a joint debt. 
4 
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27. The Court finds that the Petitioner should be awarded the Volvo. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1; The Court concludes that the parties, having previously been granted a Bifurcated 
Decree of Divorce, are still subject to the jurisdiction of the Court as set out above under the Court's 
Findings of Facts and that the Findings of Fact as set forth above are consistent with law and equity. 
2. The Court concludes that the terms, conditions and Findings on the matters tried on 
the Bifurcated Decree of Divorce are in the best interests of the parties and their minor child, that the 
terms are fair and reasonable, and all other issues of dispute have been resolved with the Court 
pursuant to the above Findings of Fact. 
SIGNED and DATED this day of , 2011. 
BY THE COURT 
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ADKINS 
Third District Court Judge 
Approval as to form 
Olivia D.Uitto 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUBMIT FOR SIGNATURE 
You are hereby given notice, pursuant to Rule 7(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that they 
undersigned attorney will submit the above foregoing order for signature by the court, upon the 
expiration of 5 days from the date of this notice, plus 3 days for mailing, unless written objection is 
filed prior to that time. 
Dated: May 23,2011 
John J, Diamond 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the date set forth below, I served a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing document identified as FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW on the 
following named persons by depositing said document in the United States mail, postage prepaid, 
addressed as follows: 
Olivia D. Uitto, Ph.D. 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 711872 
Salt Lake City, UT 84171 
DATED: May 23,2011 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the date set forth below, I served a true and accurate copy of 
the document described as AMENDED APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF on the following 
named persons by depositing said document in the United States mail, postage prepaid, 
addressed as follows: 
OLIVIA D. UITTO, Ph.D. Two (2) Copies 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 711872 
Salt Lake City, UT 84171 Attorney for Petitioner/Appellee 
DATED: March 15,2012 
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